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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1978, Minnesota became a pioneer in criminal sentencing 
reform by creating the first state sentencing guidelines 
commission.1  Other states followed suit and gradually enacted 
sentencing reforms of their own.2  The constitutionality of these 
reforms has come under increasing attack since 2000.  Based on 
the Supreme Court’s recent interpretation of defendants’ rights 
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, several states’ 
reformed procedures, including Minnesota’s, need further 
reformation to comply with the Constitution’s guarantees. 
This Note begins by briefly laying out the evolution of criminal 
sentencing over the past century.3  It then surveys judicial 
interpretation of defendants’ Constitutional rights as they relate to 
sentencing procedure, focusing on the Court’s recent invalidation 
of Washington state’s sentencing guidelines in Blakely v. 
Washington.4  The note will then examine possible reforms to 
 
 1. See Act of Apr. 15, 1978, ch. 723, 1978 Minn. Laws 761 (codified as 
amended at MINN. STAT. ch. 244 (2004)). 
 2. States that have enacted sentencing guidelines and/or commissions 
include Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia; Congress has also created a 
federal sentencing commission and guidelines.  See ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.55.125(c)–
(e), 12.55.155 (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-90-801 to -804 (2003); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 11, §§ 6580–6581 (2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 921.001–.0016 (2001); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4701 to –4719 (1995); MD. CODE ANN., Crim. Proc. §§ 6-201 to –
216 (2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 211E, §§ 1-4 (2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
769.34(2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1340.13 to –1340.17 (2004); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. §§ 181.21–.25 (West 2002); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 1501, 1508, 1512 
(2003); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 137.654–.673 (2003); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2151–2155, 
9721 (2004); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 24-26-10 to -20 (Law Co-op Supp. 2003); TENN. 
CODE ANN. §§ 40-35-101 to -114 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-25a-301 to -304 
(2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.01 (2004); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991, 994–995 (2004). 
 3. Infra Part II. 
 4. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004); infra Parts III–VI. 
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Minnesota’s sentencing guidelines pursuant to the Court’s 
decision.5  It will conclude by advocating that, despite the recent 
spotlight on Kansas’s sentencing guidelines, Minnesota’s best 
response to Blakely is to return some sentencing discretion to the 
judiciary by implementing a system of voluntary guidelines.6 
 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
 
A. Pre-Guidelines Sentencing 
 
Prior to the 1980s, “indeterminate sentencing” was the modus 
operandi.7  Under an indeterminate system, the legislature defines 
what acts constitute a crime and the maximum punishment that 
may be imposed upon a defendant convicted of that crime.8  The 
judiciary, on the other hand, determines a defendant’s guilt and, if 
guilt is established, the judge has the power and discretion to 
impose any sentence ranging from probation up to the maximum 
punishment established by the legislature for the respective crime.9  
After a criminal is imprisoned, parole boards have discretion to 
determine if the individual has been “rehabilitated” and is 
therefore eligible for release.  Thus, parole boards have the ability 
to determine the portion of a sentence a convict actually serves.10 
In the early 1970s, critics of indeterminate sentencing began to 
receive attention.11  One criticism of indeterminate systems was that 
they did not provide sufficient overall deterrence and 
incapacitation of criminals because parole boards released 
criminals back into society far before the full duration of 
sentences.12  Moreover, the broad discretion judges had in 
imposing sentences, in addition to the latitude parole boards had 
in determining what portion of a sentence was served, caused 
critics to charge that sentences were applied unfairly, based on 
factors such as race, sex, and economic class, which bear no 
 
5. Infra Part VIII. 
6. Infra Part IX. 
7.  Richard Frase, The Uncertain Future of Sentencing Guidelines, 12 LAW & INEQ. 
1, 7 (1993) (citing 1 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 1–4 
(Alfred Blumenstein et al. eds., 1983)). 
8. See id. 
9. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 973.013(1)(a) (1998). 
10.  Frase, The Uncertain Future, supra note 7, at 7. 
11. Id. at 7–8. 
12. Id. at 8. 
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relation to culpability or the harm caused by a given crime.13 
B. Minnesota’s Sentencing Guidelines 
In response to such criticism, the Minnesota Legislature 
created the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 
(MSGC).14  The MSGC ultimately created a grid that establishes a 
presumptive sentence for convicted felons based on the seriousness 
of the offense (as determined by the MSGC) and a defendant’s 
prior criminal record.  The grid presently has eleven “severity 
levels” on the vertical axis and seven “criminal history scores” on 
the horizontal axis.15  After determining the appropriate severity 
level and criminal history score, a defendant can ascertain the 
“presumed” sentence at the intersection of two scores on the grid. 
The thick black line running across the middle of the grid 
represents the “disposition line.”  The numbers in the boxes below 
the line represent the presumptive length of a stayed sentence, in 
which a period of probation is presumed appropriate for the 
defendant.  Stayed sentences are not served unless the defendant 
violates the terms of probation so that the stay is revoked.16  The 
boxes above the disposition line represent presumed prison 
sentences.  In addition to the presumed sentence, each box above 
the disposition includes a small range of numbers that represents a 
sentence the MSGC deems appropriate in most cases and is 
therefore “within” the Guidelines.17 
The legislature labels the Guidelines as “advisory” and states 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. MINN. STAT. § 244.09 (2004).  The Commission’s goal is to establish and 
maintain a system that: (1) promotes uniform, proportional sentences for 
convicted felons; (2) helps ensure that sentencing decisions are not influenced by 
factors such as race, gender, or the exercise of constitutional rights by the 
defendant; and (3) allocates the finite correctional resources to the most serious 
offenders.  MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § I (2002). 
 15. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § IV (2002).  For example, the presumed 
sentence for a defendant convicted of first degree aggravated robbery (severity 
level = VIII) with no prior criminal history (criminal history score = 0) is forty-eight 
months, with a Guidelines range of forty-four to fifty-two months.  Id.  At the 
extreme, a defendant convicted of a crime with a severity level of XI and criminal 
history score of six or more faces a presumed sentence of 426 months, with a 
Guidelines range of 419 to 433 months.  Id. 
 16. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § II, subd. D. 
 17. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § IV (shaded boxes indicating 
presumptive stayed sentence). This Note will capitalize “Guidelines” when 
referring specifically to the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. All other references 
to guidelines will use the lowercase. 
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that sentencing within them is “not a right that accrues to a 
convicted felon.”18  A judge may issue a sentence outside the 
Guidelines’ range when a case involves “substantial and compelling 
circumstances.”19  In the event of such a departure, the judge must 
make written findings of facts explaining the reasons for the 
sentence.20 
Despite its “advisory” nature, the sentence provided by the grid 
is presumed to be appropriate for every case21 and judges are 
required to follow the Guidelines’ procedures.22  Also, although the 
statutes are silent on the matter, the Minnesota Supreme Court has 
determined that not following the Guidelines’ procedures is cause 
for overturning a sentence.23 
Finally, the Guidelines require “truth-in-sentencing,”24 which is 
essential to achieving the Guidelines’ third goal of effective 
allocation of correctional resources.  In Minnesota, this means that 
every “executed” sentence—in which a defendant spends time in 
prison either as initially sentenced or after revocation of a stayed 
sentence—“consists of two parts: (1) a specified minimum term of 
imprisonment that is equal to two-thirds of the executed sentence; 
and (2) a specified maximum supervised release term that is equal 
to one-third of the executed sentence.”25  The supervised release 
period is similar to a parole term under an indeterminate 
 
 18. MINN. STAT. § 244.09, subd. 5.  The quoted language was added in 1997 in 
response to State v. Givens.  See Act of May 6, 1997, ch. 96, 1997 Minn. Laws 694, 
695 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. ch. 244 (2004)); State v. Givens, 544 
N.W.2d 774, 775 (Minn. 1996) (stating that a defendant has a right to be 
sentenced in accordance with the Guidelines, which may only be waived 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently). 
 19. MINN. STAT. § 244.10, subd. 2.  Factors that are not valid reasons for a 
departure include race, sex, or employment status.  MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
§ II, subd. D.  Factors that may warrant an upward departure (“aggravating 
factors”) include, but are not limited to: selecting a victim that is “particularly 
vulnerable,” treating a victim with “particular cruelty,” committing a felony for 
hire, committing a crime as part of a group of three or more, or committing a 
“hate crime.”  Id. 
 20. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § II, subd. D. 
 21. Id. 
 22. MINN. STAT. § 244.09, subd. 5. 
 23. State v. Geller, 665 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Minn. 2003) (noting that if a judge 
does not find facts justifying a sentencing departure and state the reasons for 
departure on the record at the time of sentencing, no departure is allowed) 
(citing Williams v. State, 361 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn. 1985)). 
24. See MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subd. 1 (mandating minimum term of 
imprisonment). 
 25. Id. 
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sentencing scheme.26  However, the required minimum term of 
imprisonment has allowed state officials to more accurately project 
future prison populations because the discrepancy in length 
between criminals’ sentences and the time actually spent in prison 
has been reduced and regulated.  These projections then help state 
officials to effectively allocate finite resources and avoid problems 
associated with overcrowded prisons.27 
C. Developments Pursuant to Minnesota’s Guidelines 
The Guidelines’ overall success in achieving the MSGC’s stated 
goals is documented28 and demonstrated by their longevity as well 
as the lack of any appreciable movement to replace them.  The 
number of states that subsequently enacted sentencing guidelines29 
also indicates the MSGC’s success and the important nature of the 
goals it seeks to achieve.  While some states enacted sentencing 
guidelines clearly modeled after Minnesota’s,30 others enacted 
schemes with different salient features.31  Of course, guideline 
systems can include some, but not all, features of Minnesota’s 
scheme; for example, Virginia’s guidelines are voluntary, but the 
state has implemented truth-in-sentencing for convicted felons.32  
Nonetheless, the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines have proven to 
 
  26. Frase, The Uncertain Future, supra note 7, at 6. 
27. Id. at 36–37. 
28. See Richard Frase, Implementing Commission-Based Sentencing Guidelines: The 
Lessons of the First Ten Years in Minnesota, 2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 279 (1993); 
MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 24–64 (1996). 
29. See Frase, The Uncertain Future, supra note 7, at 2 n. 1 (listing fourteen states 
with commission-based sentencing guidelines as of 1993); see also supra note 2 
(listing seventeen states other than Minnesota with commissions and/or 
guidelines in place). 
30. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.94A.010–.637 (2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-
4701–29 (1995). 
31. For example, rather than a grid, some states utilize a point system or a 
narrative format to establish a presumptive sentence or sentence range. See, e.g., 
www.vcsc.state.va.us/worksheets.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
11, § 4205 (2001).  Further, in contrast to Minnesota, some states’ systems are 
voluntary rather than presumptive; i.e., judges are free to depart from the 
guidelines’ suggested sentences in all cases and defendants have no recourse on 
appeal by virtue of a sentencing judge’s departure from the guidelines.  See, e.g., 
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.01 (2004); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 6-212 (2001); 
UTAH S. CT. R. pt. II app. D. 
32. The Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission produced a brochure 
advertising the salutary effects of its truth-in-sentencing, which is available from its 
web site, at www.vcsc.state.va.us/ReptCdPDFfinal.pdf. 
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be an overall success and have helped spawn various forms of 
guidelines that have served as tools in criminal sentencing across 
the nation. 
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN 
CRIMINAL SENTENCING 
A. Historical Background—Williams v. New York 
Any examination of criminal procedure requires a 
simultaneous exploration of constitutional law.  Williams v. New York 
is a landmark case that embodies the intersection of the two 
topics.33  A jury found Mr. Williams guilty of first-degree murder 
and recommended a sentence of life imprisonment.34  The judge, 
however, sentenced him to death, citing the defendant’s history of 
burglaries and morbid sexuality as reasons for disregarding the 
jury’s recommendation.35  The defendant had never been charged 
with, much less convicted of, the burglaries cited by the judge 
during sentencing.36  The defendant also never received an 
opportunity to refute the assertion of his morbid sexuality.37 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court upheld the capital sentence 
against a due process challenge because, under New York’s 
indeterminate sentencing scheme, the judge could have sentenced 
Mr. Williams to death providing no reason at all.38  Therefore, the 
Court reasoned, the sentence should not become void merely 
because the sentencing judge considered the additional out-of-
court information to assist him in the exercise of judicial discretion 
in imposing the death sentence.39  Thus, the Supreme Court 
generally recognized the constitutionality of broad judicial 
discretion in sentencing. 
B. Welcome to “Apprendi-land” 
Almost forty years after Williams, the Court reexamined the 
permissible extent of judicial sentencing discretion in Apprendi v. 
 
 33. 337 U.S. 241 (1949). 
 34. Id. at 242. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 244. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 251–52. 
 39. Id. at 252. 
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New Jersey.40  In a plea agreement, Mr. Apprendi pled guilty to 
unlawful possession of a firearm arising from an incident in which 
he fired several bullets into the home of an African-American 
family.41  The maximum sentence allowable by state statute for the 
firearm offense was between five and ten years.42  However, a 
separate “hate crime” statute provided for an extended term of 
imprisonment if the judge found by a preponderance of the 
evidence that, in committing the crime, the defendant acted with a 
purpose to intimidate a group of people because of race.43  The 
hate crime provision doubled the maximum sentence allowable for 
the firearms offense to a term between ten and twenty years.44 
The trial judge found during sentencing that the shooting was 
motivated by racial bias and sentenced Mr. Apprendi to twelve 
years in prison for the firearms offense—two years longer than 
otherwise permissible by law.45  The state appellate and supreme 
courts affirmed.46  However, on certiorari, the Supreme Court, 
divided five-to-four, ruled that the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments invalidated the extended sentence.  The majority 
opinion announced that “any fact that increases the penalty for a 
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum,” other than the 
fact of a prior conviction, “must be submitted to a jury and proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”47  Because Mr. Apprendi’s extended 
sentence resulted from a finding of racial bias by the judge using 
the preponderance of the evidence standard, it did not stand.48 
The Court further stated that, in analyzing whether the 
 
 40. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 41. Id. at 469–70.  The defendant also pled guilty on two other counts, for 
which he received concurrent sentences that are irrelevant for purposes of the 
holding’s constitutional analysis. See id. at 474. 
 42. Id. at 468 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(2) (1995)). 
 43. Id. at 468–69. The applicable statute provided: 
The court may, upon application of the prosecuting attorney, sentence a 
person who has been convicted of a crime of the first, second or third 
degree to an extended term of imprisonment if it finds . . . [t]he 
defendant in committing the crime acted, at least in part, with ill will, 
hatred or bias toward, and with a purpose to intimidate, an individual or 
group of individuals because of race, color, religion, sexual orientation 
or ethnicity. 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (1995). 
 44. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7(a)(3) (1995)). 
 45. Id. at 471. 
 46. Id. at 471–72. 
 47. Id. at 490. 
 48. Id. at 497. 
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protections of a jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt apply, 
the relevant inquiry is “one not of form, but of effect;” that is, 
courts should ask if a required factual finding exposes the 
defendant to a punishment greater than that authorized by the 
jury’s guilty verdict.49  If the answer is yes, the Constitution affords a 
defendant both protections. 
C. Apprendi’s Progeny 
The scope of Apprendi was not immediately clear.  In Gould v. 
State,50 the Kansas Supreme Court examined Apprendi in light of the 
state’s sentencing guidelines, which were modeled after 
Minnesota’s.  The jury convicted the defendant, Crystal Gould, on 
three counts of child abuse.51  Given the statutorily classified 
severity of the crime and her criminal history, Ms. Gould’s 
presumptive guideline sentence was thirty-two months for each 
count, with a standard range of thirty-one to thirty-four months.52  
However, upon the state’s motion, the district court judge departed 
from the guidelines because the victims were particularly 
vulnerable, the defendant’s conduct was excessively brutal, and the 
defendant had a special relationship with the victims.53  The court 
imposed an effective 136-month sentence on two counts, which was 
the maximum sentence the judge could impose under Kansas’s 
statutes.54 
The Kansas Supreme Court invalidated the extended sentence 
 
 49. Id. at 494. 
 50. 23 P.3d 801 (Kan. 2001). 
   51.  Id. at 806. 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id.  Kansas statutes provided: 
The sentencing judge shall impose the presumptive sentence provided by 
the sentencing guidelines . . . unless the judge finds substantial and 
compelling reasons to impose a departure.  If the sentencing judge 
departs from the presumptive sentence, the judge shall state on the 
record at the time of sentencing the substantial and compelling reasons 
for the departure. 
KAN. STAT. § 21-4716(a) (1995).  The reasons cited by the sentencing judge for 
upward departure from the guidelines were specifically enunciated aggravating 
factors under section 21-4716(b)(2).  The victims in the case were particularly 
vulnerable because they were all under two years of age at the time of the 
incidents.  Further, because all the victims were Ms. Gould’s children, she had a 
special relationship with them. Gould, 23 P.3d at 806. 
 54. Gould, 23 P.3d at 806.  Ms. Gould received a thirty-four month sentence 
on the third count, to run concurrent with the other two sentences, which is not 
relevant for purposes of the court’s Apprendi analysis. 
9
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on the ground that the statute providing for upward departures was 
unconstitutional pursuant to Apprendi.55  The jury’s verdict alone 
exposed the defendant to a sentence up to thirty-four months on 
each count.56  The 136-month sentence resulted from the judge 
finding the existence of aggravating circumstances.  Because the 
aggravating factors exposed the defendant to a sentence greater 
than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict—that is, a sentence 
within the guidelines—the court reasoned that Apprendi requires 
the State to prove the aggravating factors to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt and not to the sentencing judge by a 
preponderance of the evidence.57  Thus, for Apprendi purposes, the 
court deemed the “prescribed statutory maximum” under the 
Kansas guidelines to be the uppermost sentence within the range 
provided by the guidelines’ grid. 
Minnesota interpreted Apprendi’s scope differently.  In State v. 
Dean, a jury convicted the defendant of first-degree attempted 
murder.58  The judge granted the state’s motion for an upward 
durational departure from the Guidelines, issuing a sentence of 
240 months on that count.59  The defendant asserted an Apprendi 
defense because a judge, not the jury, found the aggravating factors 
justifying the departure from the Guidelines.  The court summarily 
dismissed this defense, stating that Apprendi applies only with 
respect to the statutory maximum—not the sentencing-grid 
maximum—for the applicable crime;60 because the statutory 
maximum for attempted first-degree murder was twenty years,61 the 
sentence did not exceed the “prescribed statutory maximum” and 
Apprendi did not apply. 
Two years after Apprendi, the Supreme Court examined the 
case’s rule as applied to Arizona’s death penalty procedure.62  In 
Ring v. Arizona, a jury convicted Timothy Ring of felony murder 
occurring in the course of armed robbery, but acquitted him on 
the alternative charge of premeditated murder because the 
 
 55. Id. at 813. 
 56. Id. at 806. 
 57. Id. at 813.  The court also refused to recognize the State’s argument that 
the principles of harmless error should be applied because neither party disputed 
the aggravating factors cited by the judge.  Id. at 814. 
 58. No. C4-02-1225, 2003 WL 21321425, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. June 10, 2003). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See MINN. STAT. § 609.17, subd. 4 (2004). 
 62. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
10
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evidence at trial failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
actually participated in the murder of an armed truck guard that 
occurred during the robbery.63 
The statutory maximum penalty for first-degree murder was 
death.64  However, Mr. Ring was not eligible for the death penalty 
by virtue of the jury’s conviction; rather, the sentencing judge, in a 
hearing before the court alone, could impose the death penalty 
only if the judge found the existence of at least one aggravating 
circumstance and no significant mitigating circumstances.65  The 
judge sentenced Mr. Ring to death after concluding that Mr. Ring 
killed the guard and that two aggravating factors were present.66 
The Court reversed the death sentence, focusing on the 
instruction in Apprendi that the relevant inquiry is one of form, not 
effect.67  While the maximum statutory penalty for the first-degree 
murder charge was death, that punishment could only be imposed 
if an aggravating fact was found to be present.  Therefore, the 
effect of the judge’s finding of “aggravating” facts was to expose the 
defendant to a greater sentence than that authorized by the jury’s 
verdict, which Apprendi does not allow.68  The sentence could not 
stand unless Mr. Ring was afforded the procedural safeguards of 
having a jury find the existence of an aggravating fact beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
IV. BLAKELY V. WASHINGTON 
 
A. Facts and Procedure 
 
Ring set the stage for the Court’s decision in Blakely v. 
Washington, which considered Apprendi’s effect on presumptive 
 
 63. Id. at 591–92. 
 64. Id. at 592 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1105(C) (2001)). 
 65. Id. at 592–93 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(F) (2001)). 
 66. Id. at 594–95.  The judge found that Mr. Ring killed the guard to receive 
something of pecuniary value and acted in an especially cruel manner in doing so.  
Id.  Both reasons are statutorily enumerated aggravating factors under Arizona’s 
capital punishment statute.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(F) (2001). 
 67. Ring, 536 U.S. at 586, 602. 
 68. Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg chided Justice Breyer’s 
dissenting opinion in Ring, characterized the holding in Ring as the logical result 
of Apprendi’s rule, and stated, “[c]oncisely put, Justice Breyer is on the wrong 
flight; he should either get off before the doors close, or buy a ticket to Apprendi-
land.”  Id. at 613. 
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sentencing guidelines schemes.69  The defendant, a paranoid 
schizophrenic, accosted his wife at knifepoint, bound her with duct 
tape, forced her into a wooden box, and abducted her.70 
The State charged Mr. Blakely with first-degree kidnapping.71  
However, the parties reached an agreement under which he pled 
guilty to second-degree kidnapping (a class B felony), domestic 
violence, and firearms allegations.72  Washington statutes stated that 
no person convicted of a class B felony could be sentenced to a 
prison term exceeding ten years.73  The state’s sentencing 
guidelines provided that Mr. Blakely faced a sentence with a 
standard range of forty-nine to fifty-three months.74  Under 
Washington’s guidelines, the judge could depart from the standard 
range for “substantial and compelling reasons,” which had to be set 
forth in written findings of fact and conclusions of law.75 
The State recommended a sentence within the standard 
range.76  However, after hearing Mrs. Blakely’s description of the 
incident, the judge departed from the guidelines and issued a 
sentence of ninety months, based on his finding that the defendant 
acted with deliberate cruelty.77  The state appellate court affirmed 
the conviction78 and the state supreme court denied review.79 
 
 69. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). 
 70. Id. at 2534. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 2534–35. 
 73. Id. at 2535 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.20.021(1)(b) (2000)). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. See also WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.535 (2000). 
 76. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2535. 
 77. Id.  “Deliberate cruelty” in a domestic violence incident is a specifically 
enumerated aggravating circumstance justifying departure from the sentencing 
guidelines.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.535(2)(h)(iii) (2000).  Had Mr. Blakely 
been convicted of first-degree kidnapping, which is the offense the State originally 
charged, he would have faced a sentence with a standard range of seventy-five to 
ninety-five months (given his criminal history and a firearms enhancement).  The 
irony of the situation is that second-degree kidnapping, when done with deliberate 
cruelty, is the logical equivalent of first-degree kidnapping.  The fact that the 
aggravated sentence imposed falls within the standard range for first-degree 
kidnapping highlights this oddity.  Mr. Blakely almost certainly pled guilty to the 
lesser offense with the hope of avoiding a sentence in the seventy-five to ninety-
month range. 
 78. State v. Blakely, 47 P.3d 149 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). 
 79. State v. Blakely, 62 P.3d 889 (Wash. 2003). 
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss4/7
KUHN 4/28/2005  11:44:05 AM 
2005] SENTENCING GUIDELINES 1519 
B. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation 
On certiorari, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,80 stated 
that Ring made clear that the “prescribed statutory maximum” for 
Apprendi purposes is not the uppermost penalty permitted by law for 
a given crime (ten years in Mr. Blakely’s case).81  Rather, it is the 
maximum penalty a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts 
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant; in 
Blakely’s case, that meant fifty-three months, the uppermost end of 
the Washington guidelines’ “standard range.”82  Because Mr. 
Blakely’s sentence exceeded the standard range based on the 
judge’s finding of deliberate cruelty (a fact neither admitted by Mr. 
Blakely nor found by the jury), the sentence ran afoul of Apprendi 
and its progeny.83 
The majority’s justification for its holding represents a classic 
example of originalist Constitutional interpretation.  Although the 
framers never conceived of a guidelines-like system for meting out 
criminal punishment,84 they did guarantee, through the Sixth 
 
 80. The Court in Blakely split 5-4 along the same lines it did in Apprendi.  
Justices Scalia, Thomas, Souter, Stevens, and Ginsburg formed the majority, while 
Justices Breyer, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented.  The 
somewhat odd sides of the debate, in which normally conservative Justices Scalia 
and Thomas sided with three more liberal colleagues to form a majority, indicates 
that the Apprendi issue was focused more on the vision of the jury versus practical 
considerations, rather than simply political ideology.  It should also be noted that 
the Court in Ring split 7-2.  Justice Kennedy begrudgingly joined the five 
“Apprendi” justices, stating that, although Apprendi was wrongly decided, Apprendi 
represents the law of the land and Mr. Ring’s case presented a “clear” application 
of Apprendi’s rule.  Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 613 (2002) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring).  While still rejecting the holding in Apprendi, Justice Breyer 
concurred with the Ring majority’s judgment on the ground that the Eighth 
Amendment mandates jury sentencing in capital sentences.  Id. at 613–14 (Breyer, 
J., concurring).  In her dissent, Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, unequivocally stated she would overrule Apprendi, a holding she 
believed “was a serious mistake.”  Id. at 619 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 81. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2538.  Justice Scalia emphatically stated, “[t]he 
‘maximum sentence’ is no more 10 years here [in Blakely] than it was 20 years in 
Apprendi (because that is what the judge could have imposed upon finding a hate 
crime) or death in Ring (because that is what the judge could have imposed upon 
finding an aggravator).”  Id. 
 82. Id. at 2537.  Throughout the remainder of this Note, the uppermost 
sentence provided by a presumptive sentencing guideline scheme will be referred 
to as the “prescribed statutory maximum.”  The maximum sentence allowable by 
law for a given crime pursuant to an upward departure from a guidelines scheme 
will be referred to as the “statutory maximum.” 
 83. Id. at 2537–38. 
 84. Judicial sentencing discretion in early America was largely non-existent: 
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Amendment, the right to trial by a jury in criminal prosecutions.  
The Court’s task was to determine the substance of that guarantee 
in light of Washington’s presumptive guidelines. 
The majority first offered, as historical support for its 
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment, quotations from Sir 
William Blackstone (“the ‘truth of every accusation’ against a 
defendant ‘should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous 
suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbours’”)85 and Joel 
Prentiss Bishop (“an accusation which lacks any particular fact 
which the law makes essential to the punishment is  
. . . no accusation within the requirements of the common law, and 
it is no accusation in reason”).86  The accusation that Mr. Blakely 
acted with deliberate cruelty was essential to his punishment 
because it was necessary to sustain an aggravated departure.  Had 
Bishop lived long enough to witness the implementation of 
Washington’s guidelines, seemingly he would have required that 
Mr. Blakely be apprised of that accusation prior to his sentencing 
hearing.  Presumably, the majority quoted Sir Blackstone to lend 
legitimacy to its conclusion that the guarantee embodied in the 
Sixth Amendment was intended to require that the “accusation” of 
deliberate cruelty be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In addition to historical sources, the majority buttressed its 
rigid interpretation of Apprendi by presenting it as the only sensible 
understanding of the right embodied in the Sixth Amendment’s 
language.87  To demonstrate the holding’s logic, Justice Scalia 
contrasted the majority’s bright-line rule with two possible 
alternatives.  First, the Court could require that a jury only need 
determine the facts the legislature chooses to designate as elements 
of a crime and leave all other facts to be “sentencing factors” that a 
judge could find.88  Theoretically, this could allow a jury to find that 
a defendant, for example, made an illegal lane change, but allow 
 
“[S]tate legislatures commonly set a specific period of incarceration for each 
offense.  As in England, the real sentencers continued to be the jurors by way of 
their verdicts.”  Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951, 
964–65 (2003). 
 85. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2536 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
343). 
 86. Id. (quoting 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 87, at 55 (2d 
ed. 1872)). 
 87. Id. at 2538 (urging that the Court’s “commitment to Apprendi in this 
context reflects not just respect for longstanding precedent, but the need to give 
intelligible content to the right of jury trial”). 
 88. Id. at 2539. 
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the judge to find as a “sentencing factor” that the infraction was 
made in fleeing the scene of a murder the driver just committed, 
meriting a hefty punishment from the court.89  The obvious 
absurdity of such a result, the majority reasoned, demonstrates a 
(theoretically) possible emasculation of the Sixth Amendment.  
Alternatively, courts could defer to legislatures’ designation of 
elements of a crime—which must be found by a jury—and 
sentencing factors—which can be found by a judge—within a 
“logical” framework.90  The problem with such a flexible approach 
is that its subjectivity could make it difficult to apply.91  Ultimately, 
the majority determined that, for the Sixth Amendment’s text to 
have true, clear substance, its bright-line approach in Blakely was 
the best possible interpretation.92 
Having defended the logic behind the Court’s extension of 
Apprendi, the majority next reconciled its holding with its earlier 
decision in Williams. In Blakely, the State attempted to have the 
extended sentence upheld by drawing an analogy between the 
broad discretion in sentencing permitted by the Williams court and 
the discretion exercised by Washington’s sentencing judge in 
finding deliberate cruelty.93  Logically, the constitutionality of 
broad judicial fact-finding allowed in Williams (under an 
indeterminate scheme) should extend to allow a similar 
discretionary exercise in the context of sentencing guidelines.94  
That the two sentences were promulgated pursuant to two different 
systems—one indeterminate, the other determinate—is an obvious 
basis for distinction. 
However, the Court engaged in a deeper analysis of the Sixth 
Amendment, explaining that the right to trial by jury is not 
categorically a limitation of judicial power; rather, it is a reservation 
of power to the jury.95  The limitation on judicial power is merely a 
function of the jury’s province to find all facts essential to 
determining a defendant’s sentence.96 Under an indeterminate 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 2540. 
 93. Brief for the State of Washington at 10–12, Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. 
Ct. 2531 (2004) (No. 02-1632). 
 94. See Jane A. Dall, Note, A Question for Another Day: The Constitutionality of the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1617, 1673 (2003). 
 95. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2540. 
 96. Id. 
15
Kuhn: Note: The Earthquake that Will Move Sentencing Discretion Back to
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005
KUHN 4/28/2005  11:44:05 AM 
1522 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:4 
sentencing scheme, once a jury establishes guilt, the defendant has 
no legal right to any sentence less than the statutory maximum for 
the given crime.  Although the finding of additional facts beyond 
the statutorily prescribed elements of the crime influence a 
defendant’s sentence, the additional facts are not essential to the 
sentence imposed.  In contrast, under presumptive sentencing 
guidelines, a finding of deliberate cruelty is essential to the sentence 
imposed because an upward departure cannot be sustained without 
such a finding.  According to the majority, the Sixth Amendment’s 
language and the jury’s historical role require juries to perform 
their traditional function of finding such an essential fact. 
V. BLAKELY’S EFFECT ON THE MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
There is no shortage of rhetoric trumpeting Blakely’s 
significance.97  Without doubt, the Court’s decision will attract the 
attention of legal scholars for years to come as its scope and 
application are clarified.  Blakely’s most significant ramification in 
Minnesota will be a restructuring of the state’s procedure for 
imposing upward departures from the Guidelines’ standard range.  
The similarities between Minnesota’s Guidelines and the guidelines 
struck down in Blakely are great.  Both schemes allow judges to 
determine the existence of “substantial and compelling”98 
aggravating circumstances justifying departure from the guidelines.  
Both require judges to set forth reasons for departure in “written 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.”99  Both direct sentencing 
judges to follow the guidelines,100 and judges who disregard the 
guidelines face reversal of the aggravated sentence.  While the 
Minnesota guideline ranges are administratively produced, a basis 
 
 97. E.g., Sandra Day O’Connor, Speech to annual conference of Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals (July 22, 2004) (analogizing Blakely to “a number 10 
earthquake”); MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, THE IMPACT OF BLAKELY V. 
WASHINGTON ON SENTENCING IN MINNESOTA: LONG TERM RECOMMENDATIONS 19 
(2004) [hereinafter MSGC LONG TERM RECOMMENDATIONS] (“[Blakely] has created 
a level of confusion and uncertainty that has never previously been experienced in 
the area of criminal sentencing.”), available at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/ 
Data%20Reports/blakely_longterm.pdf. 
 98. Compare WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.535 (West 2003) with MINN. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES § II, subd. D (2002) (using substantially the same 
verbiage). 
 99. Compare WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.535 (West 2003) with MINN. STAT. 
§ 244.10, subd. 2 (2004) (using substantially the same verbiage). 
 100. Compare WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.505(2)(a)(i) (West 2003) with 
MINN. STAT. § 244.09, subd. 5 (2004). 
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for distinction from Washington’s codified guidelines, the practical 
similarities regarding judicial fact-finding make the administrative 
distinction constitutionally insignificant and cause Minnesota’s 
Guidelines to violate defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights 
recognized in Blakely.101 
Despite the rhetoric surrounding Blakely, however, the aspects 
of criminal sentencing the decision does not cover are extensive.  
First, Blakely does not require any change to Minnesota’s present 
procedure for downward departures.  By its terms, the rule 
announced in Apprendi and extended by Blakely only pertains to 
facts that increase the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum.102  Further, voluntary sentencing guidelines are 
unaffected by Blakely.  By virtue of their voluntary nature, judges—
though discouraged from doing so—have always remained free to 
impose any punishment up to the statutory maximum regardless of 
guideline suggestions without finding any essential facts.  In 
addition, Blakely does not affect the states using indeterminate 
sentencing.  The majority specifically distinguished indeterminate 
sentencing from the guidelines at hand in Blakely103 and indicated 
no inclination to overturn its decision in Williams.  Finally, the 
Court expressly recognized that determinate sentencing schemes 
like Minnesota’s are not per se unconstitutional; sentencing 
guidelines can continue to exist in the post-Blakely era.104 
The majority opinion recognizes the value of the goals that led 
to the enactment of sentencing guidelines in Minnesota and other 
states. The Court intimated that the proper question to ask need 
not be, “What should replace sentencing guidelines?”  Rather, the 
proper question may simply be, “How can Minnesota’s Guidelines 
 
 101. The MSGC quickly recognized the weakness of the administrative 
distinction and never attempted to have the Guidelines upheld on that basis.  In a 
report for Governor Tim Pawlenty shortly after the Blakely decision, the MSGC 
unequivocally concludes that the decision affected the procedure pertaining to 
aggravated departures and a new procedure for such departures needs to be 
implemented.  MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, THE IMPACT OF BLAKELY V. 
WASHINGTON ON SENTENCING IN MINNESOTA: SHORT TERM RECOMMENDATIONS 1 
(2004) [hereinafter MSGC SHORT TERM RECOMMENDATIONS], available at 
http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/Data%20Reports/blakely_shortterm.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2005).  In the context of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the 
United States Supreme Court confirmed that the administrative distinction has no 
constitutional validity. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 752 (2005). 
 102. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537 (2004) (quoting Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)). 
 103. Id. at 2538; see infra Part VI.A. 
 104. Id. at 2540. 
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be implemented in a manner that complies with the constitutional 
rights recognized in Blakely?”105 
 
VI. SENTENCING AFTER BLAKELY 
 
Achieving uniformity and proportionality in sentencing while 
effectively allocating prison resources—the goals set forth by the 
Legislature106 and the MSGC107—remains an important task.  The 
Guidelines’ approximate twenty-five-year existence has effectively 
established these goals as a reflection of Minnesota’s public policy 
in criminal sentencing.  The present task is to determine how, in a 
post-Blakely environment, Minnesota can enact a constitutionally 
viable sentencing scheme that functions similarly to the current 
incarnation of the Guidelines and continues to effectively achieve 
the Guidelines’ goals.  In his dissent in Blakely, Justice Breyer 
identified several sentencing procedure options that states might 
adopt in Blakely’s wake.108 
 
A. Justice Breyer’s Alternatives 
 
1. Return to Indeterminate Sentencing 
 
First, as Justice Breyer suggests, Minnesota could entirely 
abandon its Guidelines and the MSGC, and simply return to 
indeterminate sentencing with a parole board.109  Unfortunately, 
there is no logical reason to expect that the unpredictable, 
disparate, and idiosyncratic sentences that previously characterized 
the system would not accompany the scheme’s return.  A majority 
of states have retained indeterminate sentencing.  Indeterminacy’s 
persistence, however, seems to reflect states’ reluctance to replace a 
long-entrenched system rather than to indicate any significant 
degree of success in doling out equitable punishments or 
rehabilitating criminals.110  In light of Minnesota’s goals, better 
 
 105. Id. “This case is not about whether determinate sentencing is 
constitutional, only about how it can be implemented in a way that respects the 
Sixth Amendment.” Id. 
 106. MINN. STAT. § 244.09, subd. 5 (2004). 
 107. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § I (2002). 
 108. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2551–62 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 109. Id. at 2553–54. 
 110. Kevin R. Reitz, The Disassembly and Reassembly of U.S. Sentencing Practices, in 
SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 222, 232 (Michael Tonry & 
18
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss4/7
KUHN 4/28/2005  11:44:05 AM 
2005] SENTENCING GUIDELINES 1525 
alternatives exist to ensure that the undesirable side effects of 
indeterminate sentencing do not return to the state. 
2. Adopt “Pure” Determinate Sentencing 
“Pure” determinate sentencing is another, equally unpalatable, 
option posited by Justice Breyer.111  Such a system uses a handful of 
essential facts to define a crime; all defendants convicted of a crime 
receive the same sentence. For example, under a simple murder 
statute, the killer who captures and tortures his victim as part of a 
murder-for-hire plan is deemed to have committed the same 
crime—and receives the same penalty—as a person who plans and 
murders, say, a former abuser.  Proportionality between the 
seriousness and culpability of one’s acts and the punishment 
imposed is clearly lost in such a system.  While guidelines were 
aimed to reduce disparity in sentencing that occurs when similarly 
situated criminals receive different sentences, an equally 
unacceptable disparity occurs when differently situated criminals 
receive the same sentence.  “Pure” determinate sentencing creates 
exactly that type of disparity by examining only a very limited 
number of facts.  Therefore, like indeterminate sentencing, pure 
determinacy is also an unacceptable response to Blakely. 
These first two options, indeterminate and pure determinate 
sentencing, focus on replacing, rather than altering, the present 
guideline system.  Implementing these options would cause an 
intolerable possibility for disparate and disproportional sentencing.  
As the majority stated, sentencing guidelines need not be scrapped 
entirely, but could be altered to comply with a defendant’s 
constitutional rights.  The question remains—what would such 
alterations entail? 
3. Adjust the Upper Ranges of the Guidelines 
Justice Breyer identified a third alternative that would, for 
Minnesota, involve changing the Guidelines’ ranges by greatly 
increasing the maximum end of each range, effectively making 
upward departures unnecessary. Meanwhile, the current Guideline 
minimums and the procedure for downward departures would 
remain unaffected by Blakely.112  This option would be a large step 
 
Richard Frase eds., 2001). 
 111. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2552–53 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 112. Id. at 2558.  See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
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in the direction of indeterminate sentencing: the arbitrariness of 
“tough” judges would no longer be checked by an effective upward 
limit in sentencing “typical” felons, but “softer” judges would still 
be constrained by the Guidelines.  Although this alternative does 
not abandon the current determinate system, it reintroduces many 
of the problems of indeterminate sentencing because sentences 
“within” the Guidelines could be inexplicably and widely disparate 
due to the broad range of sentences that would be included in the 
grid’s revised standard ranges.  Such a system would be an 
improvement on indeterminate sentencing only in proportion to 
the lack of “hard-on-crime” judges in the state.  Overall, this 
approach is a blatant—but permissible—end-run around Apprendi 
and Blakely that would present a serious potential for numerous 
arbitrary and disproportionate sentences.  Therefore, this 
alternative should not be adopted. 
4. Ask the Jury to Consider “Aggravating Factors” 
A fourth option Justice Breyer identified to make sentencing 
guidelines conform with Apprendi’s dictates is to maintain the 
present guideline system, but alter the guidelines to force 
prosecutors to charge “aggravating factors” to a jury and prove 
them beyond a reasonable doubt.113 Justice Breyer cites two ways 
this option could be implemented.114 
First, the legislature could amend its statutes to incorporate 
each fact previously considered an “aggravating sentencing factor” 
into the definition of a crime.  For example, Minnesota’s present 
controlled substance statutes115 could be amended to create further 
degrees (from the present five) based upon: (1) the number of 
transactions in which the defendant has sold drugs; (2) the 
defendant’s possession of a firearm during the sale; (3) the size of 
the geographic area in which the defendant has distributed drugs; 
and/or (4) the defendant’s position in the drug dealing 
hierarchy.116  Each crime would be assigned its own severity level on 
the Guidelines grid with a presumptive sentence. 
A potential problem with such a system, identified by Justice 
Breyer, is that some of the facts that are part of the newly defined 
 
 113. See id. at 2554. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See MINN. STAT. §§ 152.021–025 (2004). 
 116. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § II, subd. D.b(5)(a)–(g) (2002). 
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crime may not come to light until the time of trial, resulting in a 
charge that does not accurately reflect the crime actually 
committed.117  In addition, implementing such highly calibrated 
criminal statutes could place defendants in prejudicial positions at 
trial if they choose to contest all of the facts in the charge, 
including the aggravating facts incorporated into the criminal 
statutes.118  For example, a defendant who is charged under a 
revised controlled substance statute might contest that (s)he did 
not sell drugs; but, if (s)he did, it was only a few transactions, 
any/all of which occurred in the narrow confines of one 
neighborhood because (s)he was not a kingpin, but merely a local 
peddler.  Defendants contesting all the facts in the complex charge 
could suffer a critical blow to credibility that would accompany 
assuming radically inconsistent positions at the same trial before 
the same jury.  Nonetheless, defendants would want to contest each 
fact because all would be relevant to the punishment imposed. 
A second way to allow aggravating factors to be proven to a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt is to require two juries for each 
defendant whenever an aggravating factor is present.119  One jury 
would determine guilt of the crime charged and a second jury 
would try the disputed facts constituting an aggravating factor.120  
The obvious issue with such a system is the increased costs in time, 
money, and resources that bifurcated trials incur.121  Due to the 
cost, states have reserved such a procedure only for those cases in 
which the most severe penalty, death, is to be imposed.122 
B. Two Paths Through the Apprendi-Woods (The “Kansas Solution” 
and Voluntary Guidelines) 
1. Kansas—Making Sentencing Guidelines Work in Response to 
Apprendi and Gould 
 
Subsequent to the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision in State v. 
Gould,123 that state’s legislature had to amend its sentencing 
 
 117. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2555 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  For example, the fact 
that the defendant sold drugs all over the state, rather than simply within a city’s 
limits, may not come to light until testimony at trial. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 2556. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. 23 P.3d 801 (Kan. 2001). 
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guidelines to comply with Blakely.  The legislature ultimately passed 
slight amendments to the state’s statutes,124 which maintain its 
guidelines, allow for departures, comply with defendant’s 
constitutional rights to a jury trial, and avoid, to a certain extent, 
several problems associated with a Blakely-compliant scheme as 
identified by Justice Breyer. 
First, the Kansas legislature created an exception to the 
previous sentencing procedure, which mandated that judges 
impose the presumptive sentence unless the judge found 
substantial and compelling reasons and stated the reasons on the 
record.125  The exception applied only in respect of “fact[s] that 
would increase the penalty for a crime beyond the [sentencing 
guidelines’ prescribed] statutory maximum, other than a prior 
conviction.”126  Such facts have to be proven to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt in accordance with the amended procedure set 
forth in section 21-4718.127  The procedure for downward 
departures remained unchanged. 
In amending section 21-4718, the legislature mandated that, in 
order to obtain an upward departure, a prosecutor must file a 
motion with the court to seek an upward departure thirty days 
prior to trial.128  If the trial is to take place in less than thirty days, 
the motion is to be filed within five days from the date of 
arraignment.129  Aggravating facts that do not come to light before 
trial cannot be introduced to the jury at any time or serve as a basis 
for departure.130 
The procedure for allowing a jury to find aggravating facts can 
then take one of two forms.  First, the prosecutor can present 
evidence of the aggravating fact at trial and have the jury 
unanimously find the existence of the alleged fact beyond a 
reasonable doubt in a manner similar to a special verdict form.131  
Alternatively, if the court determines that “justice so requires,” a 
separate sentencing departure proceeding may be conducted as 
soon as practicable after the phase of trial establishing guilt.132  Any 
 
 124. See 2002 Kan. Sess. Laws 170. 
 125. See id. 
 126. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4716(b) (1995 & West Supp. 2002). 
 127. Id.; see also id. § 21-4718(b)(2). 
 128. See id. § 21-4718(b)(1). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. § 21-4718(b)(5). 
 131. Id. § 21-4718(b)(4). 
 132. Id. § 21-4718(b)(2)–(4). 
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person who served on the jury during the guilt-phase of the trial, 
but is unable to serve for a departure hearing, is replaced by an 
alternate juror originally impaneled for the guilt-phase of the 
trial.133  If such alternates have been exhausted, the departure 
sentence can proceed so long as the jury is comprised of at least six 
jurors.134  The right to have a jury determine aggravating facts can 
be waived; and if the right to have a jury determine innocence or 
guilt is waived, the statute provides that a defendant has also waived 
the right to have a jury determine the presence or absence of 
aggravating facts.135 
In addition to retaining the discretion to decide whether to 
conduct a separate departure proceeding or have the aggravating 
facts determined along with guilt, judges are able to determine 
whether a specified fact warrants an upward departure in the event 
a factor is not included in the non-exclusive statutory list of 
aggravating factors.136  Discretion in these two areas is important.  
By not requiring a bifurcated trial in all departure cases, Kansas has 
attempted to create a system that minimizes the costs of complying 
with defendant’s Apprendi rights.  Judges, relying on their training, 
are entrusted with the power to disallow a single trial with a special 
verdict form when doing so would cause Justice Breyer’s fear of 
prejudicial trials to be realized.  Furthermore, judges are able to 
tap their experience to determine whether a given fact—if 
proven—makes a violation more severe than the average crime in 
the rare but inevitable situation where the legislature has not 
specifically incorporated a factor into the guidelines. 
Thus, Kansas has developed a system that allows juries to 
determine beyond a reasonable doubt all facts that subject 
defendants to greater penalties, in compliance with Blakely.  The 
state’s sentencing guidelines are saved, as is the ability to depart 
 
 133. Id. § 21-4718(b)(4). 
 134. Id.  The six-juror-minimum requirement is based on the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to trial by a “jury.” The Court has 
held that the right to a twelve-person jury is not embodied in the Sixth 
Amendment, and a six-person jury is sufficient to comply with the defendant’s 
constitutional rights.  Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 99–103 (1970).  Cf. Ballew v. 
Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (holding that a five-person jury does not comply with 
a defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.) 
 135. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4718(b)(2)–(4). 
 136. Id.; see also State v. Martin, 87 P.3d 337, 340 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004) 
(determining that a defendant’s role as the mastermind of the crime is a valid 
reason for upward departure, even though the reason for departure was 
articulated by the judge and not the legislature). 
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from them in those cases where aggravating factors are known 
prior to trial, which provides flexibility that makes salvaging the 
guidelines a worthwhile endeavor.137 
2. Voluntary “Sentencing Guidelines” 
Because voluntary sentencing guidelines survive Blakely, their 
provisions and limitations are also worth examining.  Like 
Minnesota, the Virginia legislature created a sentencing guidelines 
commission (the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission, or 
VCSC)138 for the purpose of “assist[ing] the judiciary” in the 
imposition of sentences that are “appropriate and just” and make 
the most efficient use of correctional resources.139  Because the 
guidelines are voluntary, Virginia’s judges are not required to give 
the VCSC’s guidelines and efforts any practical effect. 
The VCSC developed a series of worksheets for “serious” 
crimes.140  Each crime is assigned a score.141  The VCSC also 
assigned scores to various facts relating to the commission of a 
crime.142  Findings relating to whether a defendant possessed a 
weapon at the time of the offense, has a prior criminal record, 
and/or committed the offense while on parole or probation all 
have specified point values.143  The sum of the points for the given 
crime plus the value of any additional facts found comprises the 
defendant’s total score.144  Each total score has a corresponding 
recommended sentence and the VCSC deems a sentence “in 
compliance” with the guidelines if it is within five percent of the 
presumptive sentence.145  In all felony cases other than class one 
 
 137. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem is 
Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 861 (1992) (“Departures are . . . 
essential to the proper functioning of [a] [g]uidelines system [because] [t]hey 
permit differentiation that could otherwise be achieved only through unstructured 
discretion [and] [t]hey [also] permit relatively consistent treatment of atypical 
situations and the development of coherent principles for deciding unusual 
cases.”). 
 138. 1998 Va. Acts ch. 872. 
 139. VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-801 (Michie 2003). 
 140. See www.vcsc.state.va.us/worksheets.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2005). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. VA. CRIM. SENTENCING COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 2003 23 (2003), at 
www.vcsc.state.va.us/2003Annualreport_pdf.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2005) 
[hereinafter 2003 VCSC ANNUAL REPORT]. 
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felonies, sentencing judges are instructed by statute to file a written 
explanation of any departure from the record of a case.146 
While the structure and goals of Virginia’s guidelines appear 
similar to Minnesota’s, their implementation has notable 
differences.  First, a judge’s failure to file a written explanation of a 
departure, or to follow all provisions of the state’s guidelines, 
affords a defendant no right to review on appeal or any other form 
of post-conviction relief.147  Sentencing judges148 are free to impose 
a punishment outside the guidelines, but within the statutory 
maximum, for any reason—or no reason.  For example, a judge 
may depart upward simply because, in the judge’s opinion, the 
presumptive sentence for a given crime is “too low,” and such 
blatant disregard for the guidelines will stand so long as the 
sentence falls below the statutory maximum.149  Moreover, appellate 
courts will not revise sentences reached by incorrect application of 
the guidelines—so long as the sentence remains below the statutory 
maximum—even if the misapplication increases the defendant’s 
punishment beyond the “proper” guideline sentence.150 
In practice, Virginia’s guidelines are entirely advisory and do 
not bind a court.  Because of the truly voluntary nature of 
Virginia’s guidelines, sentencing is analogous to indeterminate 
sentencing because no facts—beyond those establishing guilt—are 
essential to the imposition of a given punishment.  This is the 
precise reason that voluntary guidelines survive Blakely.151  Judges 
are free to depart from the guidelines because they do not respect 
them, because they cannot competently apply them, or for no 
ostensible reason whatsoever, and a defendant has no grounds for 
 
 146. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.01(B) (2004). 
 147. Id.  See also Runyon v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 872 (Va. Ct. App. 
1999).  Cf. State v. Geller, 665 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Minn. 2003) (holding that if a 
judge does not find facts justifying a sentencing departure and state the reasons 
for departure on the record at the time of sentencing, no departure is allowed). 
 148. Virginia allows for jury-imposed criminal sentences; the state’s sentencing 
guidelines are only utilized by judges in imposing sentences. 
 149. Burpo v. Commonwealth, No. 2831-02-2, 2004 WL 555438 at *1–2 (Va. Ct. 
App. March 23, 2004). 
 150. See Lutrell v. Commonwealth, 592 S.E.2d 752 (Va. Ct. App. 2004) 
(applying harsher sentencing guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing, rather 
than at the time of the offense, is not a basis to overturn a sentence below the 
statutory maximum). 
 151. In striking down the mandatory United State Sentencing Guidelines 
pursuant to Blakely, the Supreme Court remedially altered the guidelines to 
effectively make them voluntary and thus preserve, in part, the existing guidelines 
system. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 767 (2005). 
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appeal based on the guidelines’ implementation. While the VCSC 
specifies factors that are relevant or irrelevant to punishment and 
gauges a crime’s seriousness in light of the state’s resources, 
ultimately the VCSC’s work only provides judges with a frame of 
reference to help establish a sentence that is fair and reasonable in 
light the VCSC’s goals and studies. 
 
VII. THE EXPERIENCES OF KANSAS AND VIRGINIA 
 
A. Kansas: A Short Track Record of Success 
 
Evaluating which scheme to implement in response to the 
Blakely decision necessarily requires a close examination of the 
success each state has had in achieving uniformity, proportionality, 
and effective allocation of correction resources.  Kansas’s present 
statutory scheme for upward departures only became effective in 
June of 2002.  Consequently, there is no appreciable amount of 
literature or data regarding its costs or overall effects.  The most 
significant problem the state experienced in revising its guidelines 
seems to have been finding a way to deal with aggravated sentence 
departures that were not final at the time of Gould, but prior to the 
time the statutory amendments took effect.152 
 
 152. In one case during that timeframe, a defendant pled guilty to the 
aggravated battery charge and admitted as part of his plea bargain that—had the 
matter been to a jury trial—the jury would have found beyond a reasonable doubt 
that he had manifested excessive brutality (an aggravating fact) in committing the 
offense.  State v. Santos-Garzo, 72 P.3d 560, 560–61 (Kan. 2003).  Given the 
defendant’s admission, the district court issued a sentence five months longer 
than the guidelines’ uppermost range. Id. at 561.  Nonetheless, on appeal, the 
Kansas Supreme Court vacated the sentence because the upward durational 
departure was issued pursuant to unamended section 21-4716, which the court 
had found unconstitutional on its face. Id. at 564.  Because no constitutionally 
compliant procedure was in place to impose an upward durational departure, the 
majority ruled that no court had the ability to issue an aggravated sentence, even 
with the defendant’s admission in the case; aggravated sentences could only be 
imposed after the legislature had responded with a constitutional procedural 
scheme.  Therefore, the case was remanded for sentencing within the guidelines. 
Id. 
The MSGC, in its initial report to the governor discussing Blakely’s impact in 
Minnesota, recommended: 
[T]he state [should] move cautiously and thoughtfully as it explores 
potential changes to the current sentencing system,” and that “it may be 
more prudent for the judiciary, prosecutors and defense attorneys to 
develop temporary interim policies and procedures that are advisory in 
nature for conducting bifurcated jury trials . . . and sentencing 
procedures that impact the areas or sentencing . . . affected by [Blakely]. 
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However, once the transition to the new departure procedure 
was made, the literature and data available indicate that Kansas’s 
experience has not been a failure.  The guidelines, and ability to 
depart from them, have been preserved.  The costs of preserving 
the guidelines, although largely unknown, appear not to have been 
prohibitive.  In the two years the amended aggravated departure 
procedure has been in effect, no reports indicate that the state has 
experienced an explosion in bifurcated jury trials or an 
unmanageable load of trials straining judicial resources.  Further, 
no significant movement is underway to implement an alternative 
system.  The manageable costs of the state’s new procedure are 
possibly a result of several factors. 
The first and most important fact is that the majority of 
criminals nationwide plead guilty to the crimes charged.  Given 
that over ninety percent of criminal cases are settled by plea 
bargains, the practical effect of forcing additional facts to be found 
by juries is minimal when juries are not implicated in the vast 
majority of cases in the first instance.153  Because there are relatively 
few criminal cases that actually involve a jury trial, only a limited 
number potentially involve substantial and compelling 
circumstances that might cause prosecutors to seek an aggravated 
departure.154  From the small subset of cases that involve a jury trial 
and aggravating circumstances, presumably a number of those 
cases can have all facts fairly decided by a single jury using a special 
verdict, as Kansas’s guidelines provide.155  For example, fairness 
 
MSGC SHORT TERM RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 101, at 13.  If Minnesota courts 
adopt the view of the Santos-Garzo court, any such temporary interim policies and 
procedures could be deemed ineffective for allowing aggravated sentencing 
departures until the MSGC or the legislature makes a formal response to Blakely, 
which, as the MSGC’s report indicates, is not likely to occur in the near future. 
 153. See, e.g., Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion and Guilty Pleas, 1999 
UTAH L. REV. 205, 254 n.2 (1999) (noting that approximately ninety-two percent of 
cases in the federal judicial system are resolved by plea bargains, and state figures 
run up to ninety-seven percent, in the case of Colorado). 
 154. The MSGC estimates that only seventy-nine criminal cases in 2002 
involved a jury trial and an aggravated durational departure.  MSGC SHORT TERM 
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 101, at 6.  Overall, 358 Minnesota cases in 2003 
involved contested dispositional or durational departures.  MSGC LONG TERM 
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 97, at 9. 
 155. By allowing judges to decide if justice demands a bifurcated trial, Kansas’s 
system mitigates the possible realization of Justice Breyer’s concern regarding 
defendants being placed in untenable positions disputing an array of facts 
regarding whether, where, how and in what capacity one committed a crime.  For 
such complex situations, the bifurcated process can be utilized.  However, because 
the bifurcated process is only used in such complex situations, the overall number 
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likely will not require a separate trial to determine whether a victim 
is particularly vulnerable, a leading cause of aggravated departures 
in Minnesota,156 because the fact is normally clear (due to the 
victim’s age or mental state) and undisputed.  The seemingly 
manageable expense of Kansas’s sentencing procedure is not 
surprising given the very small number of cases that are likely to 
involve the costly bifurcated jury trial that the Blakely dissenters fear 
will cause many to shy away from a similar system. 
Judicial interpretation of defendants’ Apprendi-rights has also 
limited the costs associated with implementing Kansas’s scheme.  
As in Minnesota, Kansas’s grid includes several boxes that contain 
presumed stayed sentences of varying durations.157  The Kansas 
Supreme Court has pronounced that facts that may compel a court 
to turn a presumed stayed sentence into an executed prison 
sentence of the same length (a “dispositional departure”) need not 
be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.158  While the 
decision’s logic can certainly be challenged159—arguably, a prison 
sentence is a greater punishment than a period of supervised 
release—the rule in State v. Carr prevents some defendants from 
being able to demand a bifurcated jury trial to determine all facts 
relevant to the punishment.160  Whether states that adopt the 
 
of bifurcated trials—and the costs associated therewith—are minimized to some 
extent while still allowing for departures and respecting defendants’ constitutional 
rights. 
 156. Of the 274 aggravated durational departures in 2002, twelve percent 
(thirty-four cases) were justified on the grounds that the victim of the crime was 
particularly vulnerable.  MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINE COMM’N, 2002 SENTENCING 
DEPARTURE DATA REPORT 18 (2004), at www.msgc.state.mn.us/Data%20Reports/ 
dep2002.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2005). 
 157. See supra Part II.B. 
 158. State v. Carr, 53 P.3d 843, 850 (Kan. 2002).  The court reasoned that a 
dispositional departure does not expose a defendant to a greater punishment than 
that authorized by a jury conviction, but merely determines where an individual’s 
sentence is supervised, and thus Apprendi applies only to upward durational 
departures.  Id. at 850. 
 159. See Steven J. Crossland, Comment, Durational and Dispositional Departures 
Under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act: The Kansas Supreme Court’s Uneasy Passage 
Through Apprendi-Land [State v. Carr, 53 P.3d 843 (Kan. 2002)], 42 WASHBURN L.J. 
687, 723 (2003) (“[T]here is no rational basis for the court to apply due process 
guarantees solely to durational departures . . . [and Carr] is at odds with the spirit, 
if not the letter, of the Apprendi decision.”).  The MSGC has assumed that Carr was 
wrongly decided and the protections of a jury and burden of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt also apply to strictly dispositional departures.  MSGC LONG TERM 
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 97, at 10. 
 160. In Minnesota, for example, the latest sentencing data indicates that 
approximately twenty cases involved contested upward dispositional departures.  
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Kansas solution in Blakely’s wake agree with Carr’s logic remains to 
be seen.  In any case, the rule in Carr is another factor that has 
minimized the potential number and cost of bifurcated trials in 
Kansas. 
Nonetheless, the newfound ability to challenge an aggravating 
factor before a jury, and thereby subject it to a greater evidentiary 
standard, would logically make some defendants more willing to 
contest aggravating factors and cause some increase in the number 
of cases taken to trial.  Kansas’s experience thus far provides one 
reason to believe no explosion in the number of jury trials will 
ensue from implementation of a presumptive guideline scheme 
pursuant to Blakely.  The logical explanation behind this result 
could lie in the fact that an aggravating factor simply represents one 
additional fact a prosecutor must prove, or plea bargain with, in a 
criminal case.161  Adding one additional fact to the equation will not 
necessarily produce a major increase in the number of defendants 
demanding jury trials such that complying with their constitutional 
rights would be impossible.  More likely, prosecutors will be more 
reluctant to charge aggravating factors than at present and—
knowing the additional resources that would be required to obtain 
the result sought through trial—will only do so if the aggravating 
 
MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, SENTENCING PRACTICES: ANNUAL SUMMARY 
STATISTICS FOR FELONY OFFENDER SENTENCED IN 2002 39–40 (2004). 
 161. It is interesting to note that Blakely’s interpretation of Washington’s 
guidelines system requires that only a single aggravating fact be proven to a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt for a sentencing departure of any duration—up to the 
statutory maximum—to be constitutionally compliant.  This is noteworthy because 
once an aggravating fact—any aggravating fact—is proven to the jury, a judge’s 
departure is allowed and no additional facts are essential to the sentence imposed.  
Therefore, any additional aggravating facts a sentencing judge may consider in 
sentencing cannot be used to challenge the punishment imposed because such 
facts would only influence the judge’s decision.  For example, under Kansas’s 
present sentencing procedure, the prosecutor in State v. Gould, would have only 
needed to prove to a jury that the victims were particularly vulnerable to have 
allowed the extended sentence in the case to stand.  This would have been easy 
because the children’s ages were undisputed and could have been proven with 
ease.  Beyond proving that lone aggravating fact to the jury, the judge would have 
been free to consider and find additional aggravating facts, such as whether or not 
the defendant acted with “particular cruelty” (a fact that is much more difficult to 
prove), when deciding how much to increase the defendant’s sentence.  Blakely’s 
result, which seems to allow judges to find additional aggravating factors under 
presumptive guideline systems, appears to be illogical and to undermine the 
protections Blakely superficially affords defendants.  However, this oddity further 
demonstrates that Blakely’s bright-line rule is simply a formal interpretation of the 
Sixth Amendment’s text rather than an attempt to afford criminal defendants any 
measure of practical insulation from judicial fact-finding or discretion. 
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fact is clearly supported by strong evidence.162  In such cases, 
defendants would likely be willing to plead guilty to the aggravating 
fact, say, to have other, less-supported charges dismissed or to 
attempt to minimize the perceived increase in sentence the 
aggravating fact warrants.163  Regardless of the plausible 
explanations, the overall result in Kansas to date appears to have 
been a relatively controlled increase in monetary costs associated 
with charging aggravating facts to a jury.  The short track record, 
scant data, and unclear logic underlying this result, however, make 
tenuous any conclusions that the experience is a necessary result of 
the respective procedure. 
B. Voluntary Guidelines: A Long, but Abysmal, Track Record 
While the principal concern with Kansas’s system is cost, states 
that have voluntary guidelines are primarily concerned with the 
practical effect those guidelines have to eliminate disparity and to 
achieve a greater degree of proportionality in sentencing.  To date, 
the overall results are unimpressive.  In Maryland, for example, the 
state’s Commission on Criminal Sentencing Policy (MSCCSP) states 
the overall departure has historically been “high,” at around forty-
five percent over a ten-year period.164  The high departure rate is in 
 
 162. Such a practice could certainly be an effective way to limit the cost in 
judicial resources that implementing a Kansas-like system could have.  However, to 
a certain extent, it will also lessen the degree to which the punishment fits a 
criminal’s actual conduct if aggravating factors are only charged in a few clear 
cases and at the prosecutor’s sole discretion. 
 163. In fact, theoretically, there could be a strong incentive for a defendant 
charged with an aggravating factor to plead guilty to a greater crime in exchange 
for having the aggravating factor dropped from the charge.  Defendants would do 
this to ensure that they receive sentence of defined duration within the guidelines 
and eliminate the risk of contesting an aggravating fact, and losing, which creates 
the potential for a significantly greater sentence all the way up to the statutory 
maximum for the crime charged.  Regardless of how Blakely was decided, the 
extensive use of plea bargaining in criminal sentencing was not likely to change.  
Given this fact, the social costs of having criminal sentences determined by 
advocates in a plea bargain setting, rather than through an adversarial fact-
determination process, is an interesting topic that is outside the scope of this Note.  
Nonetheless, the theoretical incentive above, demonstrates the extent to which 
aggravating factors are a “big-stick” in plea negotiations under presumptive 
guidelines. 
 164. MD. STATE COMM’N ON CRIM. SENTENCING POL’Y, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 5 
(2003), at www.msccsp.org/publications/ar2003.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2005) 
[hereinafter MSCCSP 2003 ANNUAL REPORT].  The MSCCP emphasizes that 
compliance with the guidelines has improved over time.  For example, the overall 
departure rate declined from 58% in 1999, to 51% in 2000, to 49% in 2001.  MD. 
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spite of the facts that (1) the state’s sentencing grid has a wide 
sentencing range;165 (2) the state includes a probationary sentence 
of any length as “within” the guidelines so long as probation is the 
disposition in the appropriate grid box; and (3) since 2001, any 
sentence agreed upon in a plea bargain is considered “within” the 
guidelines, regardless of where the sentence falls on the state’s 
grid.166  In contrast, in 2002, Minnesota’s presumptive guidelines 
yielded a seventy-three percent non-departure rate despite having 
much narrower sentencing ranges, presumptive lengths for stayed 
sentences and including plea bargain sentences as departures if 
outside the standard range or dispositionally non-compliant.167 
Virginia’s voluntary guidelines seemingly have had greater 
influence than Maryland’s.  Defining compliance as any sentence 
within five percent of the presumptive sentence,168 Virginia reports 
 
STATE COMM’N ON CRIM. SENTENCING POL’Y, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2002), at 
www.msccsp.org/pulications/ar2002.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2005). These 
recent compliance rates remain, however, well above the MSCCP’s goal of a 33% 
departure rate.  Id. at II.  
 165. For example, the range of a sentencing near the middle of the state’s grid 
(involving an offense score of “eight” and an offender score of “four”) provides for 
a sentence anywhere from eight to fifteen years.  As such, even sentences “within” 
the state’s guidelines can be widely disparate with no clear explanation justifying 
differences in sentences.  The state’s sentencing matrix is available at 
www.msccsp.org/guidelines/matrices.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2005). 
 166. MD. STATE COMM’N ON CRIM. SENTENCING POL’Y, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 14 
(2002), at www.msccsp.org/publications/ar2002.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2005). 
 167. Almost ninety percent of aggravated dispositional departures are issued at 
the request of defendants but nonetheless are categorized as departures by the 
MSGC.  MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, SENTENCING PRACTICES: ANNUAL 
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR FELONY OFFENDERS SENTENCED IN 2002 28 (2004). 
 168. 2003 VCSC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 145, at 23.  At this Note’s print 
deadline, Minnesota’s grid provided approximately a five percent range in most 
boxes.  For example, a defendant situated near the middle of the grid with a 
criminal history score of three and an offense severity level of six faced a standard 
range of thirty-seven to forty-one months (a 5.1% variance around the thirty-nine 
month presumed sentence).  Only in the most severe cases did Minnesota’s grid 
provide for a standard range that is significantly less than five percent around the 
presumed sentence; for example, the most severe box on the grid provides a range 
of 419 to 433 months around a presumed sentence of 426 months (a 1.6% 
variance above or below the presumed sentence). 
  In Blakely’s wake, however, the MSGC has proposed expanding the range 
of presumptive sentences, likely to minimize the number of instances in which 
prosecutors deem it necessary to pursue a complex and costly departure process 
because a sentence within the presumptive range would not provide an 
“appropriate” punishment.  For example, a defendant with a criminal history score 
of three and an offense severity level of six would face a standard range of thirty-
four to forty forty months on the proposed grid. The most severe box on the 
proposed grid provides a range of 363 to 480 months.  MINN. SENTENCING 
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an almost eighty-percent compliance rate in 2003 for sentences 
imposed by judges.169  Thus, the VCSC’s efforts seem to have 
influenced sentencing practices in the state.  However, despite the 
relatively high compliance rate, the VCSC also reports that in over 
one-quarter of the cases involving departures, the sentencing judge 
provided no explanation of the departure170 despite a statutory 
requirement to so do.171  Similarly, in Maryland between July and 
December 2001, almost thirty percent of cases involving departures 
contained no explanation of the reasons for the variant sentence.172  
Contrasting these figures with Minnesota’s present Guidelines, 
which, pursuant to State v. Geller, require every departure to include 
a written explanation of the reasons for the extraordinary sentence, 
the transparency in sentencing under a voluntary system seems 
low.173 
What do the figures from Maryland and Virginia indicate?  
Among other things, they demonstrate that the effect voluntary 
guidelines actually have on sentencing practice can vary greatly 
from state-to-state.  However, the overall consensus is that voluntary 
guidelines are not very effective at reducing disparity or influencing 
judicial discretion in determining sentence lengths.174  In addition, 
the common absence of reasons justifying departure-sentences 
undermines the goal of achieving proportionality in sentencing; if 
the reasons why a particular crime was more or less serious than the 
“typical” crime remain unknown and unannounced, the guidelines 
perceived ability to achieve a sentence proportional to the crime 
suffers a serious credibility problem.  Voluntary sentencing 
guidelines are likely not being considered as a possible response to 
Blakely due in large part to their suspect historical ability to 
 
GUIDELINES COMM’N, NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARING TO CONSIDER MODIFICATIONS TO 
THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES ADDITIONAL MODIFICATIONS TO BE CONSIDERED—
PROPOSED SEX OFFENDER GRID 7–9 (Dec. 2004), at 
www.msgc.state.mn.us/Forms/pubheardec2004.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005). 
 169. 2003 VCSC ANNUAL REPORT 2003, supra note 145, at 24 (2003).  Jury 
sentences within the guidelines are much lower, likely due to society’s present 
“tough-on-crime” stance. 
 170. Id. at 10. 
 171. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.01 (2004). 
 172. Steven Adler & Michael Connelly, Reasons for Judicial Departure in Maryland 
Circuit Courts, July 2001-December 2001, SENTENCING FAX, December 6, 2002, 
www.msccsp.org/publications/fax/fax111.pdf 1 (last visited Feb. 27, 2005). 
 173. See supra notes 153–56 and accompanying text. 
 174. Michael Tonry, Sentencing Commissions and Their Guidelines, in 17 CRIME & 
JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 137, 140 (Michael Tonry, ed. 1993). 
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effectively achieve policy goals of uniformity, proportionality, and 
effective resource allocation. 
 
VIII.   THE CASE FOR MINNESOTA’S EXCEPTIONALISM 
 
A. Why Voluntary Guidelines are Likely to Work in Minnesota 
 
There are several logical reasons, however, to believe that 
Minnesota is uniquely situated to make voluntary guidelines work 
effectively.  The Guidelines’ longevity in the state offers two crucial 
advantages that would aid successful implementation of a voluntary 
scheme.  First, Minnesota’s judges have a deep familiarity with the 
Guidelines, arising from their experience dealing with the 
guidelines as a presumptive tool.175  Maryland points to a lack of 
knowledge regarding the guidelines as a principal reason for 
judges’ common disregard for the guidelines in sentencing;176 and 
both Maryland and Virginia177 identify ignorance as a main cause of 
the judiciary’s laxity in providing justifications for departures.  
Neither state has ever effected presumptive guidelines that have 
forced judges to acquire knowledge of the respective guidelines.  
However, that is not the case in Minnesota.  Minnesota judges’ 
present familiarity with the Guidelines’ ranges and procedure likely 
cause them to consult and implement voluntary guidelines as 
intended by the legislature and MSGC, which is the first step 
necessary to achieving the goals set forth by the MSGC. 
Another reason Minnesota’s experience with its Guidelines 
would help make a voluntary system work well is that the state’s 
twenty-five year experience with them has been a success.178  The 
MSGC has conducted extensive research in evaluating the 
seriousness of various crimes, the correctional resources available, 
reasons that logically justify departure sentences and the overall 
 
 175. While conceding that the judiciary’s overall familiarity with the 
Guidelines may diminish over time as seats on the bench turn over, an appreciable 
amount of turnover will inevitably require a significant period of time.  By the time 
any appreciable turnover actually occurs, if voluntary guidelines prove ineffective 
with newer judges, the state will nonetheless have afforded itself enough time to 
perform a more comprehensive evaluation of the costs and benefits of alternative 
responses to Blakely.  This ability to perform a better analysis of alternatives further 
demonstrates the prudence of enacting voluntary guidelines as an immediate 
response to Blakely.  See infra Part IX. 
 176. MSCCP 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 164, at 17. 
 177. VCSC 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 145, at 9–11. 
 178. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
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theory of punishment for the state.  Recognizing the MSGC’s 
dedication to providing a coherent sentencing policy and 
procedure, Minnesota’s judges are especially likely to respect the 
purpose the Guidelines serve, whether they are voluntary or not.  
Further, in light of the overall respect generated from the state’s 
positive experience with the Guidelines to date, judges would 
presumably give guideline sentencing ranges serious consideration 
to continue the positive trend in punishment that has emerged in 
this state. 
The final reason to believe that voluntary guidelines could 
work in Minnesota is that, in contrast to the federal judiciary, the 
electorate can monitor judges’ sentencing practices through 
elections to ensure that the public’s policy for punishment is being 
implemented through the judiciary.179  Careful monitoring of 
sentencing practices under a voluntary scheme—through the 
MSGC and/or private groups—could detect any appreciable return 
of unjustifiably disparate, harsh, lenient, or disproportional 
sentencing by members of the judiciary.  Assuming the Guidelines 
remain a valid expression of the state’s public policy to eliminate 
such practices, judges who disregard a voluntary form of the 
Guidelines would not likely pervade the judiciary because the 
populace could replace judges who disregard voluntary guidelines 
with individuals who express a respect for, and intent to follow, the 
Guidelines system in place.180  Combined with the benefits that flow 
from judges’ experience with—and respect for—the Guidelines, 
the opportunity to monitor sentencing practices justifies a degree 
of optimism for voluntary guidelines. 
 
 179. See MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 7. 
 180. George W. Soule, Chairman of the Minnesota Commission on Judicial 
Selection, has observed, “Typically, a judge has trouble in winning election only if 
he or she has drawn some public notoriety during the term.” Robert J. Sheran & 
Douglas K. Amdahl, Minnesota Judicial System: Twenty-five Years of Radical Change, 26 
HAMLINE L. REV. 219, 281 (2003).  Publicity of blatant disregard for the guidelines 
and the negative consequences that accompany such disregard—either in the 
form of increased costs to the state caused by inexplicable upward departures, or 
the notoriously “soft on crime” label that accompanies unjustifiable downward 
departures—could create the notoriety necessary to allow a qualified candidate 
advocating adherence to the Guidelines to mount a legitimate challenge. One role 
for the MSGC in the context of a voluntary guidelines setting could be to track 
and disseminate information relating to unexplained departures. Such a check 
would allow judicial elections to perform their task, as described by Coase, of 
providing a “mechanism to remove judges from office who are not performing 
well.” Id. 
34
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss4/7
KUHN 4/28/2005  11:44:05 AM 
2005] SENTENCING GUIDELINES 1541 
B. Why Adopting Voluntary Guidelines Is Prudent Now 
Criminal sentencing procedure is at a crossroads because of 
Blakely.  The Minnesota legislature certainly intended to limit 
judicial discretion through its initial creation of the MSGC and 
implementation of a guidelines scheme.  Blakely now forces the 
legislature to modify the established guidelines system and either 
further restrict judicial authority by removing consideration of 
aggravating factors from the bench’s purview, or return a degree of 
judicial discretion that could be channeled by the efforts of a 
commission specifically dedicated to analyzing criminal 
punishment. 
Superficially, a system modeled after Kansas’s seems to be the 
next logical step in the path of criminal sentencing, in which 
judicial sentencing discretion has been steadily curtailed through 
legislation and judicial interpretation over the past two decades.181  
Such a measure can be seen as the best way to preserve the positive 
effects the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines have had in this state. 
Certainly, a Kansas-based approach is a legitimate response to 
Blakely. 
However, limiting judicial sentencing discretion is not a goal 
in and of itself.  Rather, it is properly viewed as a means to an end, 
which is the accomplishment of the goals established by the MSGC.  
Overall, a voluntary guidelines system is superior to a Kansas-styled 
scheme because a voluntary system is likely to be equally effective 
while involving less cost and risk than the Kansas alternative. 
Moreover, a voluntary scheme would more closely follow the 
legislature’s express policy underlying the Guidelines.182 
Modifying Minnesota’s Guidelines to permit greater judicial 
discretion through voluntary guidelines would likely function in 
 
 181. Justice Scalia’s opinion indicates his belief that Kansas-modeled systems 
will be the most logical and popular response to Blakely in states that have 
implemented presumptive guidelines.  Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 
2541 (2004).  See also United States v. Booker, Nos. 04-104, 04-105, 2005 WL 50108, 
at *47–48 (U.S. S. Ct. Jan. 12, 2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority 
approach in Booker allowing United State Sentencing Guidelines to stand in 
voluntary form as judicial disregard for Congress’s intent in passing Guidelines).  
The MSGC has recommended that Governor Pawlenty effect a system roughly 
based on Kansas’s model for aggravated departures.  MSGC LONG TERM 
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 97, at 16. 
 182. It also needs to be noted that truth-in-sentencing can be implemented 
regardless of the presumptive or voluntary nature of sentencing guidelines, and 
the benefit in the area of correctional resource allocation can be reaped 
regardless of the path a state chooses to follow. 
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the same practical manner and achieve success similar to that 
which the state has experienced with prescriptive guidelines over 
the past twenty years.183  In addition to being effective, maintaining 
the present Guidelines’ procedures in voluntary form has the 
distinct advantage of being less costly on several fronts than the 
Kansas alternative. 
First, such an approach would allow the familiar sentencing 
procedure at the trial level to continue essentially unchanged, thus 
avoiding many of the efforts necessary to enact a new scheme, 
educate the judiciary on the new procedure, gain the experience 
needed to efficiently implement it, and expend the energy that 
would necessarily accompany clarifying its application.  The 
challenges to clarify Apprendi’s application to dispositional 
departures, the sufficiency of process in potentially having 
aggravating factors found by smaller-sized juries,184 and any number 
of other issues that inevitably accompany a new procedure are all 
costs that could also be avoided by simply transforming the present 
presumptive scheme into a voluntary one.185 
Further, and most directly related to monetary costs, following 
Kansas’s system amounts to writing a blank check to cover an 
unknown amount of additional judicial expenses that will 
accompany a presumably greater amount of jury trials of greater 
length and complexity.  Although one can point to the fact that 
Kansas’s system has not imploded, a single example with such a 
short track record should hardly inspire overwhelming confidence 
 
 183. See discussion supra, Part VIII.A. 
 184. The continuing validity of Williams v. Florida could be questioned in light 
of the present Court’s strong desire to maximize the role of the jury in criminal 
cases. 
 185. One especially troubling issue in implementing a revised procedure for 
aggravated departures in Minnesota would be adopting the MSGC’s proposal to 
allow judges, sua sponte, to seek such a departure.  See MSGC LONG TERM 
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 97, at 14.  The recommendation to give judges such 
power is likely a response to criticisms that Kansas’s system gives prosecutors too 
much discretion in ultimately determining defendants’ sentences by virtue of the 
ability to charge, not charge, or drop aggravating factors; thus, punishments can 
be seen as being determined by prosecutorial discretion rather than the severity of 
the crime committed.  See Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence 
Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1168–70 (2001).  
However, the MSGC recognizes the potential for challenges to such a provision as 
a violation of separation of powers; the sua sponte option would provide the judicial 
branch with limited influence in the prosecution of crimes, a function reserved for 
the executive.  In addition, it is difficult to imagine an efficient, effective, and 
practical means to prosecute an aggravating factor at the court’s demand after the 
prosecutor has refused to do the same. 
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in the long-term viability of the system.  Justice O’Connor refers to 
the majority’s decision as imposing a constitutional tax on 
guidelines systems.186  There is no reason Minnesota should rush to 
pay a “constitutional tax” of an indefinite amount by implementing 
a bifurcated-trial guidelines system when a “non-taxable” voluntary 
guidelines system is likely to achieve the same desired results. 
Finally, in examining how the state’s response to Blakely can 
best follow the spirit of the present Guidelines, it is important to 
note that Minnesota’s laws, at present, clearly provide that 
sentencing pursuant to the Guidelines is not a right that accrues to 
a convicted felon.  Rather, the Guidelines are a procedure based on 
the public policy of achieving the MSGC’s goals.187  Kansas’s system 
directly contradicts the legislature’s express vision of the Guidelines 
by making a sentence within the Guidelines a felon’s right, which 
could only be taken away by knowing and voluntary waiver or proof 
to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt of some aggravating fact.  
Voluntary guidelines, in contrast, create no such right.  A voluntary 
system would recognize that Minnesota has a clear public policy for 
sentencing, but that guidelines are truly a tool to use in the 
sentencing process, not an expansion of felons’ rights. 
In light of the present justification for the Guidelines’ 
existence, a voluntary system would more closely comport with the 
legislature’s apparent philosophy for having guidelines than a 
Kansas-style system would.  A voluntary system, therefore, is the 
most logical successor to the present system and should be 
implemented to allow the Guidelines to continue to successfully 
function as they have in the past. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Surely other states’ legislatures, and possibly the United States 
Congress, will follow the yellow brick road to a Kansas-modeled 
guidelines system.  In cases such as the federal system, in which 
sentencing guidelines are presently reviled, such a path is likely the 
best approach to ensure a tool is in place to minimize disparate or 
disproportional sentencing.  However, not all jurisdictions are 
similarly situated and therefore there is no universal “best” or “most 
logical” response to Blakely.  In light of Minnesota’s unique 
 
 186. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2546 (2004) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
 187. See MINN. STAT. § 244.09, subd. 5 (2004). 
37
Kuhn: Note: The Earthquake that Will Move Sentencing Discretion Back to
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005
KUHN 4/28/2005  11:44:05 AM 
1544 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:4 
experience with its Guidelines, the time is ripe for a swing in the 
pendulum back toward greater judicial discretion in sentencing, 
aided and directed by the efforts of the MSGC and supplemented 
by continuing the state’s implementation of truth-in-sentencing.  
By gauging the experience other jurisdictions have with such a 
system, and monitoring the resources such a system requires over 
an appreciable time, Minnesota would be in a position down the 
road to intelligently perform a cost-benefit analysis of this system 
when its effects are better known.  Presently, however, maintaining 
the guideline procedures in voluntary form is the legislature’s best 
available option when reconstructing part of the sentencing system 
Blakely tore down. 
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